The SafePay advisory counts at least six hundred victims
CISA, the FBI, and partners say SafePay has hit at least 600 victims since August 2024. Access starts with stolen passwords, phishing, and known flaws on edge devices.
The short version
The joint advisory says SafePay has affected at least 600 victims since August 2024, across critical infrastructure in the Americas, Europe, and Australia. CISA's public warning of that advisory is dated October 21, 2026.
An advisory dated October 20, a warning on October 21
CISA's news post on October 21, 2026 says the agency, the FBI, the Secret Service, and international partners released a joint advisory, AA26-293A, on the SafePay ransomware group. The advisory page itself is dated October 20. Both pages are CISA. Adversary Wire is the other account of the same release. The executive summary says SafePay has been active since August 2024 against businesses and critical infrastructure in North America, South America, Europe, and Australia, and that the group has impacted at least 600 victims. CISA's acting cybersecurity lead and an FBI assistant director are quoted on the news post. The number to remember is the agencies' number: at least 600.The advisory is the story.
The first step they name is a credential
The advisory's summary says SafePay actors typically get in by stealing or guessing passwords, by exploiting vulnerabilities on security devices, and by phishing. The October 21 news post shortens the same idea: compromised credentials, known vulnerabilities on internet-facing devices, often a VPN, then data theft and encryption, with pressure that includes a threat to publish and, in some cases, a phone call. This page stops at that access description. It does not list host tools, indicators, or the later steps the advisory gives to defenders in the field. Those lists are in AA26-293A for the people running the response. The paper's job is the path in, and the count.GlobalProtect's cookie skipped a check.
Edge devices are the product class
Chris Butera's quote on the CISA post says public-facing devices with known vulnerabilities remain a frequent target, and it points organizations at the known-exploited vulnerabilities named in the advisory plus a forensic check for compromise. The GlobalProtect cookie flaw filed beside this one is one edge-device story from the same morning, with its own identifier and its own May patch. This advisory is the group, not that single CVE. A reader who patches only one gateway and leaves the passwords guessable has done half of what the press release asked. The press release's list is short: update systems, require multifactor authentication, patch the known-exploited set, keep offline backups and test them, and segment the network.What the KEV catalog adds.
Rust does not retire a password
Safe Rust removes use-after-free and overflows in the program it compiles. SafePay's first access path, in the agencies' words, is a stolen or guessed password and a phish. A memory-safe binary that still has a password login can be entered with that password. Remade with Rust is the right response to the PHP lifetime bugs filed today, and the wrong slogan for a credential theft advisory. Using it here would tell a reader the language fixed a problem the advisory located in the login. The language fixes the lifetime class. The login has to stop being a password an outsider can guess or a page can collect.What an unsafe block has to name.
What the rebuild does change
A rebuild that deletes the password changes the advisory's first sentence. There is nothing to guess and nothing for a phishing page to ask the holder to type into a form that then becomes the account. The house stack's account is a key. Multifactor authentication, which the press release demands for password systems, is a second factor on a secret that still exists. A key the holder possesses is a different factor: the server does not store the secret that would let it sign in as the holder. That is a real reduction in the path AA26-293A describes. It is not a reduction in the edge-device vulnerabilities the same advisory tells you to patch.A patch window and the version.
Backups and segments stay ordinary
The agencies also tell operators to keep offline backups, test the restore, and segment networks so encryption in one place does not become encryption everywhere. None of that is a language property. A Rust service with one flat network and no tested restore can still lose the week to a crew that got in through a firewall. The advisory's mitigations are doing the ordinary things on the systems you have. Memory safety and a key login change which of those systems are even offering the first path. They do not replace a restore test. Adversary Wire's briefing is a second newsroom's read of the same advisory, not an extra mitigation list.What a session cannot be.
A MATA login has no password to phish
MATA's published model keeps the key on the holder's device and encrypts there, in memory-safe code, without requiring the data to sit on an external server that logs the holder in with a password. A phishing page that asks for a password is asking for a secret this account does not use. A guessed password has no field to land in. The verifier wants a signature from the enrolled device key, and a signature that fails is not a session. The digital-freedom note is that public statement. It does not say a stolen, unlocked device is harmless. Dropping that device from the roster is what stops its signatures from verifying.How MATA keeps keys on the device.
Revocation is a roster, not a password reset
The key stays with the holder, which is the privacy brief already on the site. Revocation is removing the device, after which the resolver no longer has a key that verifies that device's grants. A password reset, the usual response after SafePay's credential path, assumes the server held a secret it can replace. Here the server never had the signing key. A crew that stole a password database has not stolen a MATA login, because there is no password database on that path. A crew that stole the device itself is the case the roster is for. The advisory's 600 victims are organizations whose logins and edge devices matched the path the agencies described.The key stays with the holder.
Patch the edge device you still own
A MATA node does not become immune to a VPN appliance placed in front of it. If that appliance is one of the internet-facing products the advisory tells operators to patch, the advisory still applies to the appliance. The GlobalProtect story from this morning is an example of that class, with its own May fix. Segmentation and a tested offline backup remain the agencies' advice for the blast radius after a foothold, and they remain good advice beside any login design. The mesh changes the login and the request path. The firewall in the rack changes when you install the vendor update the advisory is pointing at.A key the holder checks.
Sources
The reports this brief is filing. Futureweb did not republish them.
Questions
Who published the SafePay advisory?
The FBI, CISA, the U.S. Secret Service, and partners including German and British agencies. The advisory identifier is AA26-293A, dated October 20, 2026. CISA's news post carrying it is October 21.
How does the advisory say SafePay gets in?
By stealing or guessing passwords, by phishing, and by exploiting known vulnerabilities on internet-facing devices, often through a VPN. The press warning says they then steal data and encrypt systems.
Does memory-safe code stop a guessed password?
No. A Rust service with a password login can still lose the password. The class in the advisory's first access path is the credential, not a heap overflow.
What does MATA change about that login?
The account is a key on the holder's device, not a password to guess. A signature that fails verification is not a session. Dropping the device from the roster stops its signatures from verifying.
What does the press release tell operators to do?
Patch known-exploited flaws on internet-facing systems, require multifactor authentication, keep offline backups and test restores, and segment networks. Indicator lists stay in the advisory.