Tor is rejecting relays that were intercepting SSH. The count 333 is not Tor's number.
Tor's October 5 note says relays were changed to intercept SSH and that flagged relays are being rejected. Ars's count of 333 is a researcher's, not Tor's.
The short version
Tor's October 5 mail says some operators' relays were compromised, that relays were intercepting SSH, and that directory authorities are rejecting flagged relays. The count of 333 exits is a researcher's figure as Ars reported it on October 22. It is not a number Tor published. This page does not print commands or addresses.
Tor's mail is the primary
On October 5, 2026 a Tor Project mail from hiro to the relay operators' list says some operators' Linux relays were compromised, that relay configuration was edited, and that relays were intercepting SSH. It says non-exit relays were turned into exits. It says directory authorities are rejecting the relays that were flagged. It says Network Health is still investigating how the hosts were entered. That mail is the record. Later news is an account of it.what a TLS certificate binds.
333 is a researcher's count
Ars Technica's October 22 story reports a researcher's count of 333 exit relays. The Hacker News item the same week uses a figure above 300. Neither number appears in Tor's October 5 mail as Tor's own census. This page will not launder a researcher's tally into a Tor Project statistic. A count of flagged relays can change as authorities reject more of them. The stable fact is the rejection, not a snapshot a reporter printed two weeks later.the advisory is the story.
What an operator is asked to notice
Tor asks operators to look at whether a relay shows an Exit flag they did not set. An unexpected exit flag is the visible symptom in the mail. The rest of the instruction is operational and stays on the list: take a suspected host offline, keep the logs, reinstall the machine rather than trying to clean it, and treat the old relay identity as stolen. This brief will not add commands, addresses, file paths, or a checklist. The flag is the thing a reader of a news page can understand. The cleanup is the operator's document.
What the mail does not finish
Tor says the investigation into how the hosts were entered is still open. A directory-authority rejection removes relays from the network clients use. It does not name every operator, and it does not say every exit in the world was affected. People who used Tor in the window are not given a personal notice in this mail. The mail is to operators. News stories that describe traffic interception are describing the impact Tor stated, plus a count Tor did not sign.the key stays with the holder.
What this page will not borrow
It will not borrow a forum writeup of an implant, a persistence trick, or a firewall rule. Those pages are not sources. Naming a family of malware as a how-to would turn a rejection notice into a procedure. The impact Tor stated is enough: relays were made to intercept SSH, some non-exits became exits, and the flagged relays are being rejected. A reader who operates a relay and needs the longer mail already has the list. A reader who does not operate a relay does not need the longer mail rewritten here.
Two weeks between the mail and the wire
The mail is October 5. The wire stories are October 21 and October 22. The gap does not make the mail less primary. It means the news cycle arrived later. A story that treats October 22 as the day the relays were first flagged would be wrong about the document. The day the authorities' work started is the day in the mail. The day the count circulated is the day in Ars. Asked directly, What should an operator do, in Tor's terms? Check whether a relay shows an Exit flag the operator did not set. If the host looks compromised, take it offline, preserve logs, reinstall rather than clean in place, and treat the old relay identity as stolen.
Who is in scope
Relay operators, especially anyone who did not intend to run an exit. People who run a non-exit and now see an Exit flag are the case the mail describes. Tor users are in scope only as people whose path might have crossed a flagged relay, which the mail does not itemize by person. People who do not use Tor are outside it. Asked directly, Did Tor publish the number 333? No. Ars attributes 333 to a researcher on October 22. Tor's October 5 mail describes the rejection and does not use that count.what RPKI checks.
What stays on the record
October 5, 2026 Tor mail. Relays compromised, configuration edited, SSH interception, non-exits turned into exits, directory authorities rejecting flagged relays, entry method still under investigation. October 22 Ars count of 333 attributed to a researcher, not to Tor. Operator action in the mail: notice an unexpected Exit flag, take the host offline, preserve logs, reinstall, treat the identity as stolen. No commands and no addresses on this page. Asked directly, What does Tor say was changed? Tor says some relays were intercepting SSH, that configuration was edited, and that some non-exit relays were turned into exits. The how stays in the operators' mail, not here.what a session cannot be.
What would move the row
A Tor follow-up that publishes Tor's own count, or that closes the question of how the hosts were entered, would be a later document. A researcher's revised tally would update the news sentence only, and only with the researcher still attached to it. Until then the record is the October 5 mail plus two later accounts. The short answer this page will stand on is this: Tor's October 5 mail says some operators' relays were compromised, that relays were intercepting SSH, and that directory authorities are rejecting flagged relays. The count of 333 exits is a researcher's figure as Ars reported it on October 22. It is not a number Tor published. This page does not print commands or addresses.the networking desk.
Sources
The reports this brief is filing. Futureweb did not republish them.
Questions
Did Tor publish the number 333?
No. Ars attributes 333 to a researcher on October 22. Tor's October 5 mail describes the rejection and does not use that count.
What does Tor say was changed?
Tor says some relays were intercepting SSH, that configuration was edited, and that some non-exit relays were turned into exits. The how stays in the operators' mail, not here.
What should an operator do, in Tor's terms?
Check whether a relay shows an Exit flag the operator did not set. If the host looks compromised, take it offline, preserve logs, reinstall rather than clean in place, and treat the old relay identity as stolen.
Does this page print addresses or commands?
No. Impact and scope only. Hunting instructions stay on Tor's list.
Is the investigation finished?
Tor says Network Health is still investigating how the hosts were entered. A rejection is not a final report.