PingCAP disabled the stolen credential
PingCAP says stolen credentials copied data and source code from September 9 to October 7. It disabled them that day. A later inventory is not this report.
The short version
PingCAP says stolen service-account credentials were used from September 9 to October 7 to copy data and source code. It disabled those credentials on October 7. It says an outside firm found no evidence the attacker ran commands or kept access in the systems reviewed, and no evidence that data stored in TiDB was changed.
The company's October 19 update
PingCAP's trust-hub update, published October 19, 2026, says an unauthorized party used stolen service-account credentials from September 9 to October 7, copied data and source code, and that PingCAP learned of it on October 7 and disabled the credentials that day. An external incident-response firm, the company says, found no evidence the attacker ran commands or kept persistent access in the systems reviewed, and no evidence that data stored in TiDB was impacted. As of October 14, the company says the compromised credentials it had identified were invalidated and the unauthorized paths it had identified were blocked.A cache rule is a different cloud fact.
What the company says was copied
The update's categories are TiDB Cloud account and product-use records, including names, emails, organization and project data, and SQL editor text; business and billing records; and an exported table of encrypted API-key values. The company says a value it tested from that table could not be used directly. It says the review did not show access to customer-cluster production. Which particular customers are in the copied set was still open in the update. This page stops at those categories. It does not print anyone's data.A replica is not a region.
What an outside account adds
InfoQ's October 25 story reports the company's timeline and says claims published by FulcrumSec, including large volume and repository counts, are not independently verified. This page does not cite that inventory, does not name customers from it, and does not describe cryptographic design claims made outside PingCAP's update. NebuSec, the firm associated with the review the company points to, says the path involved a compromised GitHub account and exposed credentials, that the encryption key for the API-key table was not exposed, and that vulnerabilities found in review were fixed and retested with no evidence of prior exploitation. Those are the review's sentences.The advisory is the update.
Who is in scope
In scope are TiDB Cloud customers whose account, billing, or product-use records were in the copied set, and people whose names or emails were in those records. The company has said the particular-customer list was still being worked. A customer who wants to know if a specific project was included has to hear it from PingCAP, not from a newspaper repeating an unverified dump. Source code the company says was copied is the company's code, which is a separate loss from customer-cluster data.A CVE names an identifier.
What 'no evidence' does not close
No evidence, in the systems the firm reviewed, is not a proof that nothing else happened. It is the finding the company published. The disabled credentials and the blocked paths are actions dated to October 7 and October 14. They do not erase copies already taken. Encrypted key material that one test could not use directly is a narrower statement than "no key was exposed," and the review's note that the encryption key was not in the copy is the sentence that supports the narrower reading.
Support credentials are a separate case
NebuSec distinguishes credentials found in support material as a separate case from the stolen service account. This page will not fold that case into the September 9 window unless the company does. A reader should treat it as the review's additional note, not as a second incident this brief has dated. Asked directly, Did PingCAP say customer data inside TiDB clusters was changed? The company says the external review found no evidence that data stored in TiDB was impacted, and no evidence the attacker ran commands or kept persistent access in the systems reviewed.
What this page will not reprint
It will not reprint an attacker's or a research blog's inventory of customers, queries, or cryptographic claims. InfoQ's label is the right size: those claims are not independently verified. The record this page will keep is PingCAP's update, InfoQ's caution, and the review notes that match the company's categories. Asked directly, What window does PingCAP give for the copying? September 9 through October 7, 2026. The company says data and source code were copied. Asked directly, What does InfoQ say about the larger public inventory? InfoQ says claims circulated by FulcrumSec are not independently verified. This page does not repeat that inventory.The key stays with the holder.
The open item
The open item is the particular-customer notice. Until PingCAP says who was in the copied tables, a blanket "your cluster data was safe" is broader than the sentence the company used. The sentence was about evidence in the systems reviewed, and about production cluster access not being shown. Asked directly, When did PingCAP say it learned about the unauthorized access? October 7, 2026. The company says it disabled the stolen service-account credentials the same day.
A funding round is not this incident
Mave's October 22 round is a different security story. PingCAP's update is an incident. They should not be read as one event, and a startup's product claim does not answer a cloud customer's question about copied records. The short answer this page will stand on is this: PingCAP says stolen service-account credentials were used from September 9 to October 7 to copy data and source code. It disabled those credentials on October 7. It says an outside firm found no evidence the attacker ran commands or kept access in the systems reviewed, and no evidence that data stored in TiDB was changed.
Sources
The reports this brief is filing. Futureweb did not republish them.
Questions
When did PingCAP say it learned about the unauthorized access?
October 7, 2026. The company says it disabled the stolen service-account credentials the same day.
What window does PingCAP give for the copying?
September 9 through October 7, 2026. The company says data and source code were copied.
Did PingCAP say customer data inside TiDB clusters was changed?
The company says the external review found no evidence that data stored in TiDB was impacted, and no evidence the attacker ran commands or kept persistent access in the systems reviewed.
What does InfoQ say about the larger public inventory?
InfoQ says claims circulated by FulcrumSec are not independently verified. This page does not repeat that inventory.
What does PingCAP say about the exported API-key table?
The company says an exported table held encrypted API-key values, and that one tested value could not be used directly. Particular-customer scope was still being identified as of the update.